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Is This the Same CIA?

By GARY McEOIN

For the first time in at least 10 years, the head of the CIA has spoken publicly about his work. His reason, he

explained, was to counter the persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency."



I must say I was amazed to learn that such criticism exists. Perhaps the CIA has means of access to domestic public opinion which I lack. But in my constant investigation of the issues raised by the existence and activities of the CIA, this one has never appeared even marginally.

On the contrary, the type of agency which Richard McGarrah Helms described in his talk would be hard to criticize. It has "no police, subpoena or enforcement powers." All it does is to collect facts about situations around the world that may affect the national security of the United States

and to project "likely developments from the facts."

But there it stops, according to Helms. "We not only have no stake in policy debates, but we cannot and must not take sides," he said. "The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts. . . . Our role extends to the estimate function. . . . but not to advocacy."

Apparently Helms has neglected to read President Eisenhower's memoirs, a grave oversight for a collector of facts. In "Mandate for Change" Eisenhower describes in detail the role of Allen Dulles, Helms' predecessor as head of the CIA, in the invasion of Guatemala in 1964 and the overthrow of that country's constitutional government by a mercenary army financed and outfitted by the CIA and private United States interests.

THE INVASION was at the point of failure when the invaders lost their air force in combat. Eisenhower in Washington reviewed the crisis with Henry Holland of the State Department and Allen Dulles. Holland, who in Eisenhower's own words was "the real expert in Latin American affairs," warned of the appalling harm the United States would suffer in Latin American and world opinion if we intervened officially. But Dulles fought him and persuaded Eisenhower to overrule him. The planes were replaced and the Guatemala government was overthrown.

Helms has also disclaimed any infiltration of the academic community. Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish political scientist and economist, expresses in his latest book ("The Challenge of World Poverty") his grave concern at the prostitution of U.S. academic life" through the financing of re-

search on Latin American problems by the CIA and other government agencies. Latin America's intellectuals fully share Myrdal's evaluation.

Eisenhower's account of his second administration ("Waging Peace") also places the CIA in a role far more extensive than the collection and projection of facts. He provides data which can be collated with information from other sources to establish the leading part played by the CIA in organizing and equipping the force assembled in Central America in 1960 to invade Cuba.

A public official engaged in espionage might possibly defend the morality of deceiving an enemy. I do not see, however, any possible moral—or even political—justification for treating the American public as the enemy to be deceived. Yet such a practice seems to have become a recognized and widely accepted part of our institutions.

The CIA is not an insignificant detail of government. Its annual budget, for which the director does not have to account, is in excess of \$3 billion. The size of its staff is classified but it reportedly more than 20,000. Employes are exempt from civil service procedures. The agency makes and enforces its own rules for hiring, investigation and firing. And, as transpired in 1969 when it refused to allow its members to testify at a court-martial of Green Berets charged with murder, it is not even answerable to the nation's judicial system.

National security considerations may justify such exceptional procedures. But they must not be: expanded to the point where they erode the bases of our system of law and justice.

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